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AbstractThis paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information a` la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007.
Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/
j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 108, 1 33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises
are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows
how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is
the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties,
as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.

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‘‘We are giving countries a greater financial incentive to
adopt crisis resistant policies by offering those that do
Contingent Credit Lines to protect them from contagion
effects’’
Stanley Fisher, First Deputy Managing Director of the
IMF (1994 2001), Policy Issues Forum, Washington DC,
April 28, 2001.
national Monetary Fund (IMF) member countries have
suffered some kind of financial troubles (see Lindgren
et al., 1996; Beim and Calomiris, 2001).
These financial crises reflect the fact that the financial
system, and especially the banking sector, not only can
amplify and transfer problems originated in other sectors
of the economy, but can also be a main driver of such crises
(for example, the financial crises of Mexico 1994, Korea1. Introduction
ng
r
1997 and Turkey 2000 had the banking sector weaknesses
at the core). Financial institutions are often linked to each
other through direct portfolio or capital connections thatFinancial crises are costly and frequent events. Duri
the last twenty five years, more than two thirds of the Inte@
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 916249647; fax: +34 916249607.
E-mail addresses: ahasman@emp.uc3m.es (A. Hasman), samartin
emp.uc3m.es (M. Samartı´n).
1 Tel.: +34 916249772; fax: +34 916249607.are desirable ex ante, but during a crisis the failure of
one institution can have direct negative effects on the other
institutions linked to it (see Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Agh
ion et al., 2000; Freixas and Parigi, 1998; Freixas et al.,
2000; Allen and Gale, 2000).
This paper provides a novel view on the interplay of sun
spots and fundamentals in the development of financial cri
ses. In particular, it does not rely on any unexpected shock
to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and
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cfinancial crises are the result of information gathering by
depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market
structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems
entering a recession can affect others with apparently stron
ger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the
first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent
Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end
of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation
of crises.
We model a four region economy, where the representa
tive bank of each region has access to an illiquid long term
investment project that allows depositors to increase their
expected welfare. Half of the banks are going to receive a
low return on their investment and will be called ‘‘bad
banks”, the other half will receive a high return on their
projects and will be called ‘‘good banks”. Additionally,
banks will maintain interbank linkages to reduce aggregate
uncertainty. Nevertheless, full linkages among banks are
not always possible and sometimes unstable structures
are set and contagion may occur.
We present three different banking market structures.
First, a market where all banks maintain interbank link
ages (complete market structure). Second, the neighboring
case, where banks are just financially connected to their
neighbors but indirectly to all the others. Finally, the island
case, where each bank keeps linkages with only one bank.
We will show that in the complete market structure the first
best allocation is achieved. In the neighboring case, differ
ent equilibria are possible: a verification equilibrium with
partial runs (with and without contagion), a verification
equilibrium with total runs, a full run equilibrium and a
no run equilibrium.
In the verification equilibria depositors gather informa
tion and penalize inefficient banks. In one of those equilib
ria, bank runs only take place in bad banks (partial bank
runs), although other banks might be affected as well (con
tagion). In the second equilibrium, there is a global with
drawal from the banking system in a contagious fashion.
There is also a full run equilibrium, where depositors do
not gather information but withdraw in a pure panic
way, and one, characterized by no runs and no information
gathering. In the island case three different equilibria are
possible: the verification equilibrium, the full run equilib
rium, and the no run equilibrium. In the verification equi
librium, bank runs are partial and there is no contagion.
Nevertheless, the expected utility is higher in the neighbor
ing case than in the island case.
The equilibria with crises of the model are fundamen
tals based and panic based at the same time. Bank runs
are related to fundamentals, although this does not mean
that bad fundamentals per se cause the run. Investors’
coordination on a particular equilibrium is triggered by a
self fulfilling prophecy. When the system is at rest, individ
uals do not find it optimal to gather information and so the
model explains why there are periods in which individuals
do not modify their expectations on banks. However, if for
any reason they decide to invest in information gatheringhey would penalize those states of nature in which banks
stablish inefficient links. This would cause the liquidation
f bad projects, but it might also generate contagion and
nancial crises when financial linkages are very inaccurate.
Following, we define the role for a Central Bank as a
arket completer. The mechanism we analyze is the one
imilar to the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) of the IMF.
he idea of the CCL is to provide a precautionary line of
efense for members with sound policies, who are not at
isk of an external payments crisis of their own making,
ut vulnerable to contagion effects from capital account
risis in other countries. We show that the CCL is a pow
rful mechanism to prevent financial crises in environments
haracterized by incomplete markets and distrustful
epositors.
The lack of strong evidence of contagious bank failures in
he periods in which the Central Bank played an active role
s a lender of last resort does not disprove the possibility of
nancial contagion through the banking system. The recent
pisode (September 2007) of depositors queuing at the
orthern Rock bank in the UK trying to withdraw their
oney, has shown that it is possible to have distrustful
epositors even in the presence of deposit insurance, author
ties defending the solvency of the institution and a healthy
eal economy. Additionally, banks in England and other
ountries in Europe2 attempting to get more liquidity is a
arning of the possibility of contagion. Our model is an
ttempt to give some insights into this possibility, and in
xplaining that a healthy interbank market is crucial in pre
enting contagious bank failures. It is obvious that more
ork on anticipating and preventing such crises is needed,
nd our paper is an attempt to go in such direction.
This paper goes in line with Allen and Gale (2000), Saez
nd Shi (2004), Leitner (2005) and Castiglionesi and Bru
co (2007) in the sense that banks maintain interbank link
ges but with the purpose to insure against negatively
orrelated technological shocks (fundamentals). The pro
osed model incorporates voluntary costly acquisition of
nformation a` la Nikitin and Smith (2007), but in our case
ndividuals are not allowed to maintain deposits in different
anks, although this is done by banks themselves. This
llows us to explain contagion.
As in Allen and Gale (2000), we model contagion as an
quilibrium phenomenon. However, we do not require an
nexpected event to model contagion. Banks maintain
nterbank linkages to insure against technological shocks
nd this makes them fragile against information acquisition
y depositors. In such context, the ‘‘incompleteness” of the
nterbank claims will determine the possibility of contagion.
Saez and Shi (2004) introduce the concept of a liquidity
ool, a claim structure where banks are indirectly con
ected, which guarantees liquidity in the presence of an
nsolvent bank and impedes contagion. In our case the
2 For example, the Deutsche bank had bought 3.56% of Northern Rock,
onsequently, the values of its shares were also affected.
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tCentral Bank provides an efficient solution to overcom
financial contagion. As in Castiglionesi (2007), the Centra
Bank plays the role of a market completer but when th
problems are due to fundamentals and not to liquidit
ones. Therefore, the results of the present paper indicat
that those institutions should be free of intervention b
local governments since their objective is to work as
‘‘market completer” or global insurer avoiding the usua
political restrictions to capital mobility. Such institution
reallocate resources from developed to underdeveloped
economies allowing the system to achieve the first bes
allocation.
The work by Leitner (2005), introduced the threat o
contagion as part of the optimal network design. The ide
is that when agents are not linked to one another, agent
who have high endowments have no incentive ex post to
help out those who have low endowments. Thus, som
positive net present value investments do not take place
On the other hand, when agents are linked to on
another, agents with high endowments are willing to bai
out those with low endowments, since failure to do so
leads all projects to fail by contagion. On the contrary
in the present paper, the linkages appear because bank
cannot anticipate the success of their projects, and there
fore the possibility of contagion is a cost that banks hav
to assume.
The seminal contribution by Castiglionesi and Brusco
(2007) provides a model where different regions are subjec
to different levels of moral hazard, and have negativel
correlated liquidity needs. Integrated financial market
increase expected social welfare, but only at the cost o
greater financial instability. As a consequence, and con
trary to Allen and Gale’s finding, contagion is greate
the more interconnected banks are. They conclude tha
banks establish links and accept the risk of contagion
only when the risk is not too high. In this respect, it i
close to our results for incomplete markets. We find tha
the more incomplete the banking structure is, read th
island case, the less vulnerable to contagion it is. Never
theless, depositors prefer the neighboring case to the island
case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the basi
model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes th
social optimal allocation. Section 4, introduces financia
intermediaries (banks), and analyzes different market struc
tures and their respective equilibria. Sections 5 shows how
a Central Bank provides an efficient solution to overcom
financial contagion. Finally, Section 6 presents a numerica
example and Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a three date (t = 0, 1, 2) economy and on
single good. There are two types of assets: A liquid asse
that takes one unit of the good at date t and converts it into
one unit of the good at date t þ 1 (storage). An illiquid
asset that takes one unit of the good at date 0 and transforms it into RH or RL units of the good at date 2 depending
on the state of nature. It is assumed that 0 6 RL < 1 < RH
and that the expected return ðR ¼ 1
2
RL þ 1
2
RH Þ is greater
than one. If the illiquid technology is liquidated prema
turely at t ¼ 1, we obtain r, with 0 6 r < 1.
There are four regions in this economy. Each region
consists of a continuum of ex ante identical consumers
depositors with an endowment of one unit of the consump
tion good at t ¼ 0. They are subject at t ¼ 1 to a privately
observed uninsurable risk of being of either of two types.
Type 1 (or impatient) agents derive only utility from con
sumption in period one and type 2 (or patient) agents
derive only utility from consumption in period 2. In addi
tion, type 2 agents can privately store the good from
t ¼ 1 to t ¼ 2. Their utility function is as follows:
Uðc1; c2Þ ¼
uðc1Þ with probability c ðType 1Þ;
uðc2Þ with probability ð1 cÞ ðType 2Þ;

ð1Þ
where the utility function uð:Þ is defined over non negative
levels of consumption, is strictly increasing, strictly
concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies
Inada conditions. There is no aggregate uncertainty and
so the probability c represents the fraction of early consum
ers in the economy. Consumer’s type is his private
information.
There is also a continuum of identical banks in each
region, or a representative bank in each region. A bank is
a financial institution which invests in the technology on
behalf of consumers and provides them with consumption
at t ¼ 1 or t ¼ 2. Each consumer deposits his endowment in
the bank at t ¼ 0, and in exchange he receives a demand
deposit contract. Competition among banks forces them
to offer a contract that maximizes the expected utility of
the representative consumer. This contract pays a fixed
amount at each date, and in the event that this is not pos
sible all available funds will be divided pro rata in propor
tion to claims (as in Allen and Gale (1998), we do not
assume a sequential service constraint). In particular, the
demand deposit contract gives the depositor the right to
withdraw either c1 at t ¼ 1 or c2ðRÞ at t ¼ 2. The second
period random return reflects the fact that having invested
in a random technology, the bank may not be able to make
its promised payment at date 2. In this sense the only risk
the depositors bear is that they will not be repaid their
money in the situation in which it is physically impossible
to repay them.
It is also assumed that banks in half of the regions will
obtain a high return on their investment project (expansion
banks, from now on good banks), and the other half a low
one (recession banks, from now on bad banks). Neither
bankers nor depositors know the type of their own banks
nor that of the other ones. Nevertheless, they know the dis
tribution of shocks in the whole economy. The information
is revealed to consumers depositors at t ¼ 2, although
they can obtain information at t ¼ 1 at a cost of e. This
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tinformation cost can be understood as a monitoring cost.
Although information might be perfect and free, depositors
need time and other resources to process it.3
Notice that if we consider all banks as a single one there
is no aggregate uncertainty concerning technology shocks,
since R ¼ 1
2
RL þ 1
2
RH . Finally, it is assumed that depositors
cannot deposit in banks in more than one region.a
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in3. Social optimum
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the
expected welfare of a representative consumer. We will
focus on the range of parameters under which the social
planner should never interrupt illiquid technology
investment at t ¼ 14 and even inefficient projects should
be completed and resources on verification should not be
spent. The social planner should use storage to provide
for consumption of impatient agents. The planner
maximizes:
Max
fx;y;c1;c2g
cuðc1Þ þ ð1 cÞuðc2Þ; ð2Þ
subject to xþ y 6 1; ð3Þ
cc1 6 y; ð4Þ
ð1 cÞc2 6 Rx; ð5Þ
xP 0; y P 0; c1 P 0; c2 P 0; ð6Þ
where y is the amount invested in storage, x is the
amount invested in the illiquid technology, c1 is the con
sumption of impatient consumers and c2 the consumption
of patient ones. Eq. (2) is the expected utility to be maxi
mized. Eq. (3) is the date 0 constraint which states that
all the resources should be used for storage or investment
and Eq. (4) the first period one. It states that the amount
of storage should be enough to provide for consumption
of type 1 consumers. Similarly, Eq. (5) shows that the con
sumption of type 2 consumers comes from the illiquid
technology.
Optimality requires that the feasibility constraints are
satisfied with equality, so we can write the problem as
Max
y½0;1
cu
y
c
 
þ 1 cð Þu 1 y
1 c
R
 
: ð7Þ
Since uðÞ is strictly concave and satisfies the Inada condi
tions, the solution to problem (7) is unique and interior.
The optimal value yð0; 1Þ is obtained from the first order
condition
u0
y
c
 
¼ Ru0 1 y

1 c
R
 
ð8Þ
3 See Nikitin and Smith (2007) for a discussion of this
assumption.
4 Verification is never socially optimal for values of e, such that,
eP e ¼ max 12 r R
L
R
 
; 0
n o
. For a detailed derivation of this result, seeNikitin and Smith (2007). snd once y has been determined by Eq. (8) we can use
he feasibility constraints to determine the other
ariables:

1 ¼
y
c
; c2 ¼
1 yð Þ
1 c
R; x ¼ 1 y: ð9Þ
otice that (8) and (9) imply that u0ðc1Þ ¼ Ru0ðc2Þ; which in
urn implies u0ðc1Þ > u0ðc2Þ and c2 > c1. Thus, the first best
llocation automatically satisfies the incentive constraint
2 P c1; that is late consumers have no incentive to behave
s early consumers. We will call W  ðy; x; c1; c2Þ the first
est allocation, and U  the expected utility achieved under
he first best allocation.
. Decentralized economy with banks
Decentralization of the social optimal allocation can be
chieved in the same way as in Allen and Gale (2000). Each
ank issues demand deposits contracts. These deposits pay

1 ¼ y

c if withdrawn in the first period, provided that the
ank is solvent. In the second period all remaining assets
re liquidated and allocated among deposit holders on a
ro rata basis.
Each bank stores y share of the period 0 deposit, and
nvests the rest in the illiquid technology. The amount of
torage technology should be enough to just satisfy the
iquidity needs of impatient agents. Additionally, banks
re going to establish linkages ex ante, in order to insure
gainst the technology shock. Let zij be defined as the loan
hat bank j receives from bank i (by assumption zij ¼ zjiÞ.
iven that agents are risk averse, and that the bank type
ay be revealed only in period 1, it is optimal that bank i
preads interbank loans for an amount of zi ¼ nnþ1
h i
¼
nþ1
j 1;j 6 izij across the banking system (where n is the number
f links each bank has). This interbank loans pays zijRHx if
ept until t = 2, when the bank is of a good type, and zijRLx
hen the bank is of a bad type.5 If liquidated at t = 1, it
ill pay the same as other deposits withdrawn in the first
eriod ðzijc1Þ. Recall that the interbank loans are
ompensated simultaneously between banks, so if bank 1
ecides to cancel its interbank loan at t ¼ 1, it will also have
o pay back its obligation with the other banks in that
eriod.
With four banks there are three types of financial link
ges that are symmetrical: (1) the full linked case (complete
arket structure), (2) the neighboring case, and (3) the
sland case (the last two cases are examples of incomplete
arket structures).6 We assume that the structure of the
anking system is known at the very beginning but not
he type of each bank nor that of the depositor.
5 This structure of interbank loan payments facilitates savings in
onitoring costs while profiting from diversification. It may also be
terpreted as banks’ shares in other banks in the system.
6 We use symmetrical allocations for simplicity of exposition. However,
imilar results can be obtained with non-symmetrical linkages.
4
ss
x
s
s
Þ
Þ
Þ
Þ
Þ
Þ
Þ
e
s
s
e
x
e
s
f
s
,
4.2. The neighboring case4.1. Complete market structure
In the complete market structure (full linked case), each
bank is linked to three other banks and therefore there i
only one possible state of nature which is represented in
Fig. 1.
From now on, G1 and G4 are going to be the good bank
and B2 and B3 the bad banks. A number 1 in the matri
means that there is a linkage between those banks. In thi
case, zi ¼ 34 and zij ¼ 14. In the presence of full linkage
among banks, the first best equilibrium is achievable.
The demand deposit contract is obtained as a solution to
the following problem:
Max
fx;y;c1;c2g
cuðc1Þ þ ð1 cÞ 1
2
uðcB2 Þ þ
1
2
uðcG2 Þ
 
; ð10
subject to xþ y þ zj zi 6 1; ð11
cc1 6 y; ð12
ð1 cÞcB2 6 ½RLð1 zjÞ þ RLzij
þ RHzij þ RHzijx; ð13
ð1 cÞcG2 6 ½RH ð1 zjÞ þ RLzij
þ RLzij þ RHzijx; ð14
1
2
uðcB2 Þ þ
1
2
uðcG2 ÞP uðc1Þ; ð15
xP 0; y P 0; c1 P 0; cB2 P 0;
cG2 P 0; zi ¼ zj ¼
X4
j 1;j6 i
zij; ð16
where cG2 represents second period consumption in a good
type bank and cB2 second period consumption in a bad typ
one. zj are total interbank loans received from other bank
in the system and obviously zj ¼ zi ¼
P4
j 1;j 6 izij. Eq. (10) i
the expected utility to be maximized. Eq. (11) is the period
0 constraint and Eq. (12) the first period one. Eqs. (13) and
(14) correspond to the second period constrains, in the cas
of a bad bank and a good bank, respectively.
Given that each bank has an obligation equal to zjeRi
with the rest of the system and at the same time has th
right to receive zieRjx from the other banks; the resource
available in the second period are given by the return o
the projects minus the obligations with the system plu
the right to receive from other banks: ½eRi zjeRi þ zieRjxFig. 1. Complete market structure.where eRi is the expected return from our technology, andeRj is the expected return from our neighbors. Finally, Eq.
(15) is the incentive compatibility constraint that guaran
tees that type 2 depositors do not have incentives to imitate
type 1 depositors.
It is straightforward to see that cB2 ¼ cG2 ¼ c2 and
½RLð1 zjÞ þ RLzij þ RHzij þ RHzij ¼ R; and therefore we
have the same problem as in the social optimum given by
Eqs. (2) (9). Since c2 > c

1, each agent has incentives to
respect his type, and the social optimal allocation is
attained. It is never optimal for consumers to spend
resources in obtaining information about the type of the
bank in the first period. This result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. The first best allocation W is attainable in a
complete market structure.In the neighboring case, banks are financially connected
to two other banks in the system forming a close group.
Given political, geographical and/or historical reasons,
some regions like A and C or B and D in Fig. 2 are not
directly connected although they are indirectly connected
through their neighbors.
Bankers and consumers depositors know this informa
tion from the very beginning, although they do not know
in which type of bank they are nor the type of their neigh
bor banks (they just know the structure of the game). Nev
ertheless, depositors can obtain this information at t ¼ 1 at
a cost of e.
We have three possible states of nature: One case where
a good bank is linked to two bad ones or a bad bank con
nected to two good ones, Fig. 3a, and two cases where a
good bank is connected to one good bank and one bad
one, Fig. 3b and c. All states are going to be equally prob
able, and are represented in Fig. 3.
However, those three states of nature can be separated
into two: that of Fig. 3a with probability 1
3
and those of
Fig. 3b and c with probability 2
3
. In the neighboring case,
each bank will maintain total interbank loans of zi ¼ 23
and so zij ¼ 13. Now, consumers depositors are going to
solve the following problem:Fig. 2. The neighboring case.
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Fig. 3. States of nature in the neighboring case.fx;y;c1N ;fct2ig
t¼1;2
i¼L;H g
1N
2 3 2L 3 2L
þ 1
2
1
3
uðc12H Þ þ
2
3
uðc22HÞ
 	
ð17Þ
subject to xþ y zi þ zj 6 1; ð18Þ
cc1N 6 y; ð19Þ
ð1 cÞc22L 6 ½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzij þ RLzijx
¼ 2
3
RL þ 1
3
RH
 
x; ð20Þ
ð1 cÞc12L 6 ½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzij þ RHzijx
¼ 1
3
RL þ 2
3
RH
 
x; ð21Þ
ð1 cÞc12H 6 ½RHð1 zjÞ þ RLzij þ RLzijx
¼ 1
3
RH þ 2
3
RL
 
x; ð22Þ
ð1 cÞc22H 6 ½RHð1 zjÞ þ RLzij þ RHzijx
¼ 2
3
RH þ 1
3
RL
 
x; ð23Þ
1
2
1
3
uðc12LÞ þ
2
3
uðc22LÞ
 
þ 1
2
1
3
uðc12H Þ þ
2
3
uðc22HÞ
 
P uðc1NÞ; ð24Þ
xP 0; y P 0; zi ¼ zj ¼
X
zij; ð25Þ
c1N P 0; c12L P 0; c
2
2L P 0;
c12H P 0; c
2
2H P 0; ð26Þ
where c1N is the consumption of impatient consumers,
c12L ðc12HÞ is the consumption of a patient depositor in a
bad (good) bank in state 1, and c22L ðc22H Þ is the consumption
of a patient depositor in a bad (good) bank in states 2 and 3.
Eq. (17) is the expected utility to be maximized. The first e
a verification equilibrium with total runs, a full run equilib
rrow of the objective function is the expected consumption
of type 1 agents and the expected consumption of type 2ected consumption of type 2 agents in a good bank. Eq.
18) is the period 0 constraint, where as before x is the
mount invested in storage, y the amount invested in the
lliquid asset and zj ðziÞ are total interbank loans received
rom (given to) the neighbor banks. Eq. (19) is the first per
od constraint, and Eqs. (20) (23) are the second period
nes, that will depend on the bank type and the state. Eq.
20) corresponds to the case where a depositor is at a bad
ank that is in states 2 or 3. The equation states that the
onsumption offered to patient depositors comes from the
ank’s project return ðRLxÞ, less its obligations with the
anking system ðzjRLxÞ plus the funds received from its
eighbors ðzijRHxþ zijRLxÞ. Eq. (21) corresponds to the case
f a bad bank in state 1. The bad bank is connected to two
ood banks. Similarly, Eq. (22) represents the contract of
ered to patient depositors by a good bank that is in states
or 3, while Eq. (23) is the one offered by a good bank that
s in state 1. Finally, Eq. (24) is the incentive compatibility
onstraint, which is expressed in expected terms, as the bank
gnores both its return and that of its neighbors.
Although c12L ¼ c22H ¼ cH2 and c22L ¼ c12H ¼ cL2, we will
reat them separately because they will have different con
equences in understanding the equilibria.
Let
¼ y; x; c1N ; fcs2igs 1;2i L;H
n o
e the optimal allocation offered to consumers depositors
n an incomplete market structure of the neighboring case.
t will be shown that in this case the first best allocation is
ot achievable. In the neighboring case, a depositor would
nd it optimal ex post to liquidate his deposits prematurely
f the cost of obtaining information about their bank type
n the first period is not too high, and provided other
epositors are also acquiring information.
.2.1. Equilibria with liquidation and contagion in the
eighboring case
In this case, the possible equilibria are: a verification
quilibrium with partial runs (with and without contagion),ium and a no run equilibrium. In the last two equilibria,
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withdraw from all banks or do not acquire information
and do not withdraw.
As shown below, if condition (27) is satisfied, when
depositors verify the type of banks, and they are in state
2 or 3, it is always optimal to withdraw their deposits from
bad banks. As a result, these banks have to liquidate thei
technology and their interbank loans, and will be able to
pay a total amount of cc1N ¼ xrþyþzijc1N1þzij < c1N .7 On the othe
hand, the good bank will have to liquidate part of its long
term asset in order to pay its interbank loans to the bad
bank; however it would not enter into a bank run as long
as dc2H ¼ RH ð1kÞxð1cÞ > c1N , where k is the proportion of the
investment in the long term asset that has to be liquidated
in the first date in the good bank in order to be able to
guarantee the promised consumption of c1N .
8
Nevertheless, if second period consumption in the good
bank is less than the promised one, that is, dc2H < cH2 , the
good bank is affected by contagion and is contractually
bankrupt. This is the case of a verification equilibrium with
partial bank runs and contagion. There is contagion
because the expansion bank, even if it does not experience
a run, it cannot pay its promised consumption to its late
consumers.9
Another interesting case is the one of state 1, where a
good bank is connected to two bad banks. In this state
depositors of good banks will generate a financial crisi
due to the fundamentals of bad banks. As c1N > cL2 patien
depositors have incentives to withdraw from the good
banks (note that c22L ¼ c12H ¼ cL2Þ. On the other hand, i
we define c2L ¼ xRLð1kÞð1cÞ , where as before k is the proportion
of the investment in the long term asset that has to be liq
uidated in the first date in the bad bank in order to be able
to guarantee a consumption of c1N , then as c2L < c1N then
patient depositors will also withdraw from bad banks. The
curiosity is that if patient depositors of good banks wai
until t = 2, they would receive less than depositors from
bad banks. In this verification equilibrium with total bank
runs all depositors receive xr þ y.10
The following propositions describe conditions for the
existence of the different equilibria. All proofs are con
tained in Appendix A.
7 Notice that dc1N ¼ xrþyþzijc1Nþzijc1N1þzi , where the numerator represent
assets available given by the liquidation of the long term asset, the storag
technology and liquidation of interbank loans with the good and the bad
bank respectively. The liabilities of the bank are given by the denominator
of the equation. Therefore, dc1N ¼ xrþyþzijc1N1þzij .
8 With k ¼ ½C1N ðcþzijÞ y zijcC1N rx .
9 This verification equilibrium with contagion will occur whenever k is
greater than a value k, for which dc2H ¼ cH2 , that is, k ¼ 1=3ðRH RLÞRH . We
thank the reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
10 This equilibrium takes place because of the linkages that good banks
have established ex ante, due to the uncertainty about the future return.
Finally, those linkages result in worse than being alone. This can be the
case of depositors of banks in developed countries disapproving of their
banks investing in other banks in underdeveloped countries.Proposition 2. In states 2 and 3, there is a verification
equilibrium in which only bad banks are liquidated and good
banks can either be affected or not by contagion, whereas in
state 1, all depositors will withdraw their deposits generating
a financial crisis based on fundamentals.
The previous statement is going to be true when the fol
lowing conditions are satisfied:
c1N P cL2 ; ð27Þdc2H P c1N ; ð28Þ
1
3
uðdc2H eÞ þ 1
3
uðxr þ y eÞ þ 1
3
uðcc1N eÞ
P
1
3
uðdc2H Þ þ 2
3
uð0Þ; ð29Þ
1
3
uðdc2H eÞ þ 1
3
uðxr þ y eÞ þ 1
3
uðcc1N eÞP;
1
3
uðc1N Þ þ 1
3
uðcc1N Þ þ 1
3
uðxr þ yÞ: ð30Þ
Eq. (27) indicates that the lowest possible consumption in
the second period is smaller than consumption promised
to impatient depositors. As a result it is optimal for patient
depositors of bad banks in states 2 and 3 to withdraw their
deposits in the first period (as well as for patient depositors
of good banks in state 1). Eq. (28) guarantees that good
banks will have enough resources to compensate patient
depositors and avoid a bank run in states 2 and 3.
Finally, Eqs. (29) and (30) state that if all other deposi
tors are playing the verification equilibrium it is optimal to
play it.11
Additionally, we still have the traditional equilibria,
which are given in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The no run and the full run are also Nash
Equilibria of this game, if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1
2
uðcH2 Þ þ
1
2
uðcL2ÞP uðc1N Þ; ð31Þ
1
2
uðc1N eÞ þ 1
2
uðcH2 eÞ 6
1
2
uðcH2 Þ þ
1
2
uðcL2Þ; ð32Þc1N P r: ð33Þ
Eqs. (31) and (32) guarantee that an agent has no incentive
to deviate in the no run equilibrium. Eq. (31) is the incen
tive compatibility constraint while Eq. (32) guarantees that
the benefit obtained by verifying and withdrawing when the
outcome is inefficient, is lower than the expected utility
achieved in the no run equilibrium. Finally, Eq. (33) guar
antees the existence of the full run equilibrium. This condi
tion says that if all depositors withdraw in the first period,
neither good nor bad banks have enough resources to pay
them the promised amount of c1N .
11 For a better description of these two equations, see Appendix A.
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In the island case, each bank is financially connected to
just one bank in the system. As a consequence, we also
have three possible states: One case where a good bank is
connected to the other good and the bad bank to the other
bad one, Fig. 4a and two cases where a good bank is linked
to a bad bank, Fig. 4b and c. Each state is going to be
equally probable.
In this case, banks will maintain total interbank loans of
zi ¼ 12 and so zj ¼ 12.
Now, consumers depositors are going to solve the fol
lowing problem:1 2 B 1 A
  p
t
s
t
f
E
I
b
b
c
t
n
W
b
i
b
w
m
f
4
a
rMax
x;y;c1;fct2ig
t¼1;2
i¼L;Hf g
cuðc1IÞ þ ð1 cÞ
2 3
uðc2LÞ þ 3 uðc2LÞ
þ 1
2
1
3
uðcA2H Þ þ
2
3
uðcB2HÞ
 	
ð34Þ
subject to xþ y zi þ zj 6 1; ð35Þ
cc1I 6 y; ð36Þ
ð1 cÞcA2L 6 ½RLð1 zjÞ þ RLzix ¼ RLx;
ð37Þ
ð1 cÞcB2L 6 ½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzix
¼ 1
2
RL þ 1
2
RH
 
x; ð38Þ
ð1 cÞcA2H 6 ½RHð1 zjÞ þ RHzix
¼ RHx; ð39Þ
ð1 cÞcB2H 6 ½RHð1 zjÞ þ RLzix
¼ 1
2
RH þ 1
2
RL
 
x; ð40Þ
1
2
2
3
uðcB2LÞ þ
1
3
uðcA2LÞ
 
þ 1
2
1
3
uðcA2H Þ þ
2
3
uðcB2HÞ
 
P uðc1IÞ; ð41Þ
xP 0; y P 0; c1I P 0; cA2L P 0;
cB2L P 0; c
A
2H P 0; c
B
2H P 0; ð42ÞFig. 4. States of naturehere c1I is the consumption of an impatient consumer,
A
2L ðcA2H Þ is the consumption of a patient depositor of a
ad (good) bank in state I, and cB2L ðcB2H Þ is the consump
ion of a patient depositor of a bad (good) bank in states
I and III. Eq. (34) is the expected utility to be maximized.
he first row of the objective function is the consumption
f type 1 agents and the expected consumption of type 2
gents in a bad bank. The second row represents the ex
ected consumption of type 2 agents in a good bank. Eq.
35) is the period 0 constraint, where x is the amount in
ested in storage, y the amount invested in the illiquid asset
nd zj ðziÞ are total interbank loans received from (given
o) the partner bank. Eq. (36) is the first period constraint,
nd Eqs. (37) (40) are the second period ones, that will de
end on the bank type and the state. Eq. (37) corresponds
o the case of a bad bank in state I. It states that the con
umption of patient depositors comes from the banks’s re
urn ðRLxÞ, less its obligation with the system ðzjRLxÞ, and
rom the return obtained from the other bank ðzijRLxÞ.
q. (38) corresponds to the case of a bad bank in states
I and III. Similarly, Eq. (39) refers to the case of a good
ank in state I and Eq. (40) represents the case of a good
ank in states II and III. Finally, Eq. (41) is the incentive
ompatibility constraint, which is expressed in expected
erms, as the bank ignores both its return and that of its
eighbors.
Let
b ¼ y^; x^; c^1I ; fc^s2igs A;Bi L;Hn o
e the optimal allocation offered to consumers depositors
n an incomplete market structure of the island case. It will
e shown that the equilibrium achieved in the island case is
orse than the first best allocation achieved in the complete
arket structure and also worse than the second best of
ered in the neighboring case.
.3.1. Equilibria with liquidation in the island case
In the island case, three different equilibria are possible:
verification equilibrium (with partial bank runs), a full
un equilibrium and a no run equilibrium.in the island case.
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ÞIn the verification equilibrium, depositors verify the typ
of banks, and withdraw from bad ones. As a result, in
state I, impatient and patient depositors of bad banks wi
receive xr þ y. Impatient depositors of good bank
will receive bc1I ; while patient depositors of good banks wi
receive bcA2H . In the other two cases (states II and III), impa
tient depositors will receive c^1I , while patient depositor
will receive c^B2H ¼ c^B2L ¼ c^T2 .
The difference with the verification equilibrium of th
neighboring case is that NO contagion occurs.
The following propositions describe conditions for th
existence of the different equilibria. All proofs are con
tained in Appendix A.
Proposition 4. In state I of the Island case, there is
verification equilibrium where depositors of bad bank
withdraw their deposit in the first period due to fundamental
and depositors of good banks wait until t = 2 and obtain th
maximum return, if the following conditions are satisfied:
c^1I P c^A2L; ð43
2
uðc^T2 eÞ þ
1 ðxr þ y eÞ þ 1 ðc^A2H eÞÞ
Þ
f
.
e
n
e
Þ
Þ3 6 6
P
2
3
uðc^T2 Þ þ
1
6
uð0Þ þ 1
6
uðc^A2H Þ; ð44
2
3
uðc^T2 eÞ þ
1
6
uðxr þ y eÞ þ 1
6
uðc^A2H eÞ
P
5
6
uðc^1IÞ þ 1
6
uðxr þ yÞ: ð45
Eq. (43) guarantees that it is optimal for depositors o
bad banks to withdraw their deposits in the first period
Eqs. (44) and (45) ensure that if all agents play th
verification equilibrium, it is not optimal for any agent to
deviate.
As in the neighboring case, we have the traditional equi
libria, which are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5. In the island case, the no run and the full ru
are still Nash Equilibria, if the following conditions ar
satisfied:
2
3
uðc^T2 Þ þ
1
6
uðc^A2LÞ þ
1
6
uðc^A2H ÞP uðc^1IÞ; ð46
2
3
uðc^T2 Þ þ
1
6
uðc^A2LÞ þ
1
6
uðc^A2H Þ
P
2
uðc^T2 eÞ þ
1
uðc^1I eÞ þ 1 uðc^A2H eÞ; ð47Þ
e
e
ll
r
the same consumption as patient depositors of good banks in state 1
ðc22L ¼ c12H ¼ cL2Þ. Similarly, patient depositors of good banks in states 2
and 3 received the same as those of bad banks in state 1 ðc12L ¼ c22H ¼ cH2 Þ.
93 6 6
c^1I P r: ð48
Eqs. (46) and (47) guarantee that an agent has no incen
tive to deviate in the no run equilibrium. Eq. (46) is th
incentive compatibility constraint while Eq. (47) guaran
tees that the benefit obtained by verifying and withdraw
ing when the outcome is inefficient, is lower that th
expected utility achieved in the no run equilibrium. Final
ly, Eq. (48) guarantees the existence of the full run equi
librium. This is the condition that guarantees that if a
depositors withdraw in the first period, neither good nobad banks have enough resources to pay them the prom
ised amount of bc1I .
5. The role for a Central Bank
As a consequence of the rapid spread of the Asian crisis
of 1997 1998 to the global financial markets, the IMF
introduced the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in 1999.
The idea of the CCL was to provide a precautionary line
of defense for members with sound policies, who were
not at risk of an external payments crisis of their own mak
ing, but were vulnerable to contagion effects from capital
account crisis in other countries. The package allowed
those countries that met certain eligibility criteria, to draw
on a pre specified amount of resources if hit by a financial
crisis due to factors outside of the member’s control.
We have seen in the previous sections that in the pres
ence of an incomplete market structure of the neighboring
case, banks are subject to the risk of contagion and finan
cial crises. In this section, we will show that there is a role
for a Central Bank to complete markets. In our setting, the
Central Bank will require reserves from banks at date 0 and
will redistribute such reserves into the banking system in
the form of credit lines to banks. With the Central Bank,
the first best allocation is achieved when the financial sys
tem is incomplete.12
The World Bank and other international institutions
like the IMF reallocate resources during financial crises.
In what follows, we show that such behavior can be
socially optimal. The Central Bank is going to require
reserves of T i ¼ 14

 
from each bank which is going to main
tain in the system T j ¼ 14

 
in order to allow banks to max
imize depositors’ expected utility.
These reserves work in the same way as interbank loans,
banks will have to pay an amount to the Central Bank, that
is contingent on the resources available in the second
period, that is, T j½eRi zjeRi þ zieRjx (where eRi is the
expected return from our technology, and eRj is the
expected return from our neighbor banks). Additionally,
banks will receive a payment in the form of a ‘‘Contingent
Credit Line” from the Central Bank that will restore the
social optimal allocation. The intuition says that the Cen
tral Bank will complete markets, and so bad banks that
are in states 2 and 3 and good banks in state 1 will receive
T iRHx, which is more than what they pay ðT iRHx > T j
½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzij þ RLzijxÞ. On the other hand, good
banks that are in states 2 and 3, and bad banks of state 1
will receive T iRLx, which is less than what they pay
ðT iRLx < T j½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzijþ RHzijxÞ.13
12 It should be noted that in the island case, there is no role for a Central
Bank, as in the bad state of nature there is no contagion and that is why
bad banks are penalized and good banks are not affected.
13 Recall that patient depositors of bad banks in states 2 and 3 obtained
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iThe problem to be maximized, when a Central Bank is
introduced, is as follows:
Max
fx;y;c1N ;fct2ig
t¼1;2
i¼L;H g
cuðc1N Þ þ ð1 cÞ 1
2
1
3
uðc12LÞ þ
2
3
uðc22LÞ
 
þ 1
2
1
3
uðc12H Þ þ
2
3
uðc22HÞ
 	
ð49Þ
subject to xþ y zi þ zj T i þ T j 6 1; ð50Þ
cc1N 6 y; ð51Þ
ð1 cÞc22L 6 f½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzij þ RLzij
 ð1 T jÞ þ T iRH gx; ð52Þ
ð1 cÞc12L 6 f½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzij þ RHzij
 ð1 T jÞ þ T iRLgx; ð53Þ
ð1 cÞc12H 6 f½RHð1 zjÞ þ RLzij þ RLzij
 ð1 T jÞ þ T iRH gx; ð54Þ
ð1 cÞc22H 6 f½RHð1 zjÞ þ RLzij þ RHzij
 ð1 T jÞ þ T iRLgx; ð55Þ
1
2
1
3
uðc12LÞ þ
2
3
uðc22LÞ
 
þ 1
2
1
3
uðc12H Þ þ
2
3
uðc22HÞ
 
P uðc1NÞ; ð56Þ
xP 0; y P 0; c1N P 0; c12L P 0;
c22L P 0; c
1
2H P 0; c
2
2H P 0; ð57Þ
zi ¼
X
zij; T i ¼ T j ¼ 1
4
: ð58Þ
Eq. (49) is equal to Eq. (17), the objective function in the
neighboring case. Eq. (50) is the budget constraint, that
is equal to Eq. (18) of the neighboring case, except that it
considers reserves required and received from the Central
Bank. Eq. ( 51) is the first period constraint which is also
identical to Eq. (19) in the neighboring case and finally,
Eqs. (52) (55) are the second period constraints, which
take into account amounts paid to and received from the
Central Bank, respectively.
Eq. (52) corresponds to the case where a depositor is at a
bad bank that is in states 2 or 3. Recall that the bad bank is
connected to one good bank and to one bad one. In this
case, the bank pays a proportion T jx of the resources avail
able in the second period, that is, T jx½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzijþ
RLzij, and so it has ð1 T jÞx½RLð1 zjÞ þ RHzij þ RLzij left.
On the other hand, it receives the amount T ixRH as a con
tingent credit line. The rest of the equations have a similar
interpretation. Eq. (53) corresponds to the case of a bad
bank in state 1. Eq. (54) represents the contract offered
to patient depositors by a good bank that is in states 2 or
3, while Eq. (55) is the one offered by a good bank that
is in state 1. Finally, Eq. (56) is the incentive compatibility
constraint, which is identical to Eq. (24) of the neighboring
case.
Under these conditions, it is easy to show that the first
best allocation is achieved. Notice that c22L ¼ c12H ¼
f½RLð1zjÞþRH zijþRLzijð1T jÞþT iRH gx
1c ¼ Rx1c. Similarly, c12L ¼ c22H ¼
f½RLð1zjÞþRH zijþRH zij ð1T jÞþT iRLgx
1c ¼ Rx1c, and so the problem iseduced to the social planner’s problem analyzed in Section
.
The idea is that the Central Bank guarantees the optimal
evel of risk sharing and therefore avoids contagion and
nancial crises. Those international institutions work as
nternational market insurers (or market completers), since
t is frequent to observe that although some financial sys
ems are not connected due to political or economic rea
ons, they can be indirectly connected through those
nternational institutions in order to avoid financial crises
nd increase social welfare.
It should be noted that in practice the behavior of the
MF is affected by the fear of moral hazard problems. This
mplies that the CCL would be extended in state 1, or in
tates 2 and 3, but when there is contagion ðk > kÞ. In
ur setting moral hazard is absent and so it is welfare supe
ior to avoid information gathering and to prevent every
nancial crisis equilibria.
. Numerical example
A numerical example nicely illustrates the results pre
ented in this paper. In the example that follows, preferences
nd parameters values are displayed in Table 1; while the
esults from the optimization problem appear in Table 2,
olumns 1 4, for the complete market structure, the neigh
oring case, the island case and autarky, respectively. For
hese values, all the conditions for the existence of the differ
nt equilibria in the neighboring case are satisfied for any
2 ð0:058; 0:06Þ. Similarly, all the conditions for the exis
ence of the different equilibria in the island cased are satis
ed for any e 2 ð0:126; 0:151Þ. Note that for these values
erification is never socially optimal, as e ¼ 0:023.
Additionally, we obtain that in states 2 and 3 of the neigh
oring case there is a verification equilibrium with partial
ank runs and contagion. There is contagion because the
xpansionbank, even if it does not experience a run, it cannot
ay its promised consumption to its late consumers. Recall
hat this equilibrium takes place whenever the proportion
f the long term asset that is liquidated at t = 1 (k), is greater
han a threshold level of k, which guarantees that second
eriod consumption is equal to the promised one. In the
xample, k ¼ 0:25 > k ¼ 0:235, and so we have a verifica
ion equilibrium with partial runs and contagion (Table 1).
Obviously, the highest expected utility corresponds to the
ompletemarket structurewhere the first best is achieved fol
owed by the neighboring and the island cases respectively.
he occurrence of contagion does not impede that the alloca
ion reached in the neighboring case is higher than that of the
sland case. Therefore, contagion and crisis are the conse
uences of the higher expected utility that can be reached
hen a complete market structure is not a possible one.
. Conclusion
The paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of
nformation a` la Nikitin and Smith (2007), in a framework
10
similar to Allen and Gale (2000). This allows us to model
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Table 2
Numerical example
Complete market
structure
Neighboring
case
Island case Autarky
x ¼ 0:5 x ¼ 0:5 x ¼ 0:5 x ¼ 0:514
y ¼ 0:5 y ¼ 0:5 y ¼ 0:5 y ¼ 0:486
c1 ¼ 1 c1N ¼ 1 c1I ¼ 1 c1IMP ¼ 0:973
c2 ¼ 1:1 c22L ¼ 0:9 cA2L ¼ 0:5 c2H ¼ 1:7458
EU ¼ 0:0476 c12L ¼ 1:3 cB2L ¼ 1:1 c2L ¼ 0:513
c12H ¼ 0:9 cA2H ¼ 1:7 EU ¼ 0:041
c22H ¼ 1:3 cB2H ¼ 1:1
EU ¼ 0:039 EU ¼ 0:0182
ðxr þ yÞ ¼ 0:75 ðxr þ yÞ ¼ 0:75dc1N ¼ 0 8125dc2H ¼ 1:275c2L ¼ 0:375
Table 1
Values of the parameters
uðc1Þ uðc2Þ RH RL r c R k k k e
Lnðc1 þ kÞ Lnðc2 þ kÞ 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.000001 0.25 0.235 0.023the relationship between shocks to fundamentals and con
tagion, without relying on any unexpected shock to mode
contagion.
In the paper, depositors can modify their behavior due
to the use of costly information. When the system is at rest
individuals do not find it optimal to gather information
and so our model explains why there are periods in which
individuals do not modify their expectations on banks
However, if for any reason they decide to invest in informa
tion gathering they would penalize those states of nature in
which banks establish inefficient links. This would cause
the liquidation of bad projects, but it might also generate
contagion and financial crises when financial linkages are
very inaccurate.
In the neighboring case, two possible equilibria with
contagion, due to fundamentals, are possible. In the firs
one, bad banks fail and good banks are affected by conta
gion. Even though good banks are not affected by bank
runs and can meet their obligations with impatient depos
itors, the malfunctioning of the interbank payment system
obliges them to liquidate part of their long term technol
ogy. As a result, good banks go bankrupt in the second
period. In the second equilibrium, depositors in good
banks withdraw their deposits generating a collapse o
the entire banking system. These equilibria have very low
probability but can explain the occurrence of some interna
tional financial crises.
From our analysis, it can be concluded that a complete
market structure is resilient to shocks in fundamentals. Fo
the case of incomplete market structures, we find that the
more incomplete the banking structure is, read the island
case, the less vulnerable to contagion it is. Nevertheless
depositors prefer the neighboring case to the island caseIn this respect our results are similar to those of Castiglio
nesi and Brusco (2007). They find that banks establish links
and accept the risk of contagion only when the risk is not
too big.
Finally, we analyze the existence of international institu
tions like the World Bank and the IMF. In our model,
those institutions appear as an optimal solution when polit
ical restrictions impede perfect capital flows. We present
the importance of some mechanisms like the Contingent
Credit Line (CCL) of the IMF to eradicate crises and pre
vent contagion.
It should be noted that in our setting moral hazard is
absent and so it is welfare superior to avoid information
gathering and to prevent every financial crisis equilibrium.
An avenue for future research would be to analyze the opti
mality of those institutions in the presence of moral hazard
or aggregate uncertainty.
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Appendix A
First,considerconditionsfortheexistenceofequilibriainthe
IncompleteMarketStructureoftheneighboringcase.
Proof of Proposition 2. In states 2 and 3, depositors of bad
banks receive cL2, which is smaller than c1N (Eq. (27)). If
depositors acquire information and find out that they are in
those states, they will withdraw their deposits in the first
year. Eq. (28) guarantees that patient depositors of good
banks will still find it beneficial to wait until t = 2, and so
there are no bank runs. On the other hand, if depositors
gather information and realize that they are in state 1, they
would behave as impatient consumers and will generate a
financial crisis. Eq. (27) ensures that patient depositors of
good banks would prefer to behave as impatient depositors
(note that c12H ¼ c22L ¼ cL2Þ, but since bad banks do not have
enough resources to compensate its interbank loans,
patient depositors of bad banks will also withdraw their
deposits generating a global financial crisis.
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bad banks have enough resources to pay them the
p
R
A
A
A
B
C
C
F
F
L
L
N
R
SFinally, Eqs. (29) and (30) ensure that if all other agents
re playing the verification equilibrium, it is optimal to
lay it. Eq. (29) states that the expected utility an agent
chieves by acquiring information and withdrawing from
nefficient banks is higher than that obtained by doing
othing, and waiting until the second year. Eq. (30) ensures
hat an indiscriminate withdrawal is neither optimal. h
roof of Proposition 3. Eqs. (31) and (32) ensure that
atient depositors do not have an incentive to deviate in
he no-run equilibrium. Eq. (31) is the incentive compatibil-
ty constraint that results from:
1
3
uðc12LÞ þ
2
3
uðc22LÞ
 
þ 1
2
1
3
uðc12H Þ þ
2
3
uðc22HÞ
 
P uðc1NÞ;
here the left hand side is the expected utility of patient
epositors and the right hand side is the expected utility
f impatient ones. We obtain the result of the formula by
aking use of the fact that c12L ¼ c22H ¼ cH2 and c22L ¼
1
2H ¼ cL2.
Eq. (32) guarantees that the expected utility of patient
epositors is greater than the expected utility obtained by
he policy of acquiring information and withdrawing when
he consumption offered for being patient is low.
Finally, Eq. (33) guarantees the existence of the full-run
quilibrium. This is the condition that guarantees that if all
epositors withdraw in the first period, neither good nor
ad banks have enough resources to pay them the
romised amount of c1N .
Second, consider conditions for the existence of equi-
ibria in the Incomplete Market Structure of the island
ase. h
roof of Proposition 4. In state I, if depositors from bad
anks obtain information and realize that they are in that
tate, they will receive bcA2L which is less than bc1I , so they will
ehave as impatient depositors. As a consequence, bad
anks are liquidated and pay xr þ y to all depositors. Good
anks are not affected by the shock since they do not have
inks with bad banks, and so they will pay depositors as
romised in the demand deposit contract.
Eqs. (44) and (45) guarantee that if all agents play the
erification equilibrium, it is not optimal for any agent to
eviate. Eq. (44) states that the expected utility an agent
chieves by acquiring information and withdrawing from
nefficient banks is higher than that obtained by doing
othing, and waiting until the second year. Eq. (45) ensures
hat an indiscriminate withdrawal is neither optimal. hroof of Proposition 5. Eqs. (46) and (47) guarantee that if
ll other agents do not gather information (play the no-run
quilibrium) it is not optimal for any agent to deviate.
Eq. (46) is the incentive compatibility constraint that
esults from:
2
3
uðbcB2LÞ þ 13 uðbcA2LÞ
 
þ 1
2
1
3
uðbcA2H Þ þ 23 uðbcB2HÞ
 
P uðbc1IÞ;
here the left hand side is the expected utility of patient
epositors and the right hand side is the expected utility
f impatient ones. We make use of the fact that c^B2L ¼
B
2H ¼ c^T2 .
Eq. (47) guarantees that the expected utility of patient
epositors is greater than the expected utility obtained by
he policy of acquiring information and withdrawing when
he consumption offered for being patient is low.
Finally, Eq. (48) guarantees the existence of the full-run
quilibrium. This is the condition that guarantees that if all
epositors withdraw in the first period, neither good norromised amount of bc1N . h
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